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ABSTRACT
This paper examines how pension plans affect employee behavior and firm
performance. Theoretically, the impact of pensions on firm performance cannot
be predicted. Firms with pensions should have lower turnover rates and more
efficient retirement decisions; their employees will be less likely to shirk.
On the other hand, pension compensation is not very closely linked to worker
performance and there is some risk that turnover may fall too much. The
evidence indicates that although wages do not seem to fall with pension
compensation, profit rates are not affected by pension coverage. This suggests
that pension coverage is associated with higher productivity, a proposition
that is supported by indirect evidence on pensions, turnover, and productivity
but not by direct tests of how pension coverage and productivity are
correlated.
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Pension benefits represent a form of deferred compensation that a worker
receives after he retires from a firm, provided he has met certain age and
service requirements. The magnitude of these benefits depends on the nature of
the employment contract and whether the worker and the firm have fulfilled the
obligations of that contract. This chapter examines the role of pensions as a
form of compensation and how pensions are used as a component of personnel
policy. Such a review requires a clear understanding of how future pension
benefits are evaluated by workers and financed by firms. Having determined
these concepts, we can assess the influence of pensions on firm performance.
Pensions are strictly regulated by the federal government and so our
examination will include a brief review of current regulations and how they
temper the impact of pensions on firm performance.
Our examination of pensions begins with a brief overview of the growth and
development of the employer pension system in the United States. This includes
a discussion of the distribution of pensions by worker and firm
characteristics. In section II, specific plan characteristics are described
and their importance is discussed. Next, we present several alternative
rationales for why workers and unions want pensions as part of their
compensation. Section IV presents competing models of the pension contract and
develops predictions for the effect of pensions on compensation and
performance. The impact of pensions on employee behavior is considered from a
theoretical perspective in section V; section VI assesses the evidence
concerning the impact of pensions on firm performance. The final section
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reports our conclusions and discusses some areas where further research would
be useful.
Growth and Development of Employer Pensions
While public pensions in the United States are as old as the republic
(dating to benefits for Revolutionary War veterans), private pensions first
appeared in the late nineteenth century. Greenough and King (1976) credit the
American Express Company with establishing the first formal employer pension
in 1875. Early pensions were generally found in railroads, banking, and public
utilities. Prior to World War II, growth in pension coverage was slow;
however, in the immediate post-war period there was a rapid increase in
the number of employers offering pensions and the number of workers covered by
a pension. The proportion of wage and salary workers in the private sector
covered by an employer pension grew from 25 percent in 1950 to over 50 percent
in 1984. Most of this growth occurred prior to 1975. In the last decade,
coverage rates have changed only modestly. The proportion of covered workers
actually fell from 56 to 52 percent between 1979 and 1983 (Andrews, 1985).
Growth in coverage and increases in benefits raised the percentage of payroll
going to pensions from 1 percent in 1950 to 6 percent in 1980 (Fields and
Mitchell, 1984).
Ippolito (1986a) estimates that in 1984 there were 788,000 pension plans, of
which 744,000 covered fewer than 100 participants. Allowing for duplicate
coverage, these plans contained 57.5 million active participants and 8 million
annuitants. Public employees have always been more likely to be covered by an
employer pension than private sector workers. Currently, over 90 percent of
state and local workers and all federal workers are covered by an employer
pension (Munnell, 1979).3
How can the observed pattern of development of pensions be explained?
Several factors may have stimulated the surge in pension coverage after World
War II. A comprehensive assessment of the economic rationale for the existence
of pensions is provided in subsequent sections of this chapter. However, it is
useful to point to several changes that occurred during the 1940s which may
have provided the impetus to increased pension coverage. First, the 1942
amendments to the Internal Revenue Code clarified and expanded tax treatment of
pensions and precluded the establishment of pension funds limited to corporate
officers (Creenough and King, 1976). Second, wartime stabilization policy made
it easier to increase fringe benefits than cash wages. Third, in 1949 the
National Labor Relations Board ruled in the Inland Steel decision that pensions
were a proper subject for collective bargaining. This action removed a
constraint that limited unions' ability to achieve pension coverage for their
members and may have altered union attitudes toward seeking pension benefits
(Allen, Melone, and Rosenbloom, 1984).
Are there similar specific events that might explain the slowdown in the
growth of the coverage rate in the last decade? In 1974, the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) was enacted. This legislation imposed a
sweeping new set of regulations on the use and funding of pensions. In the
last decade, a number of additional modifications to the pension laws have been
instituted. These regulations have raised the administrative costs of pensions
and reduced the range of permitted pension contracts. Some have speculated
that restrictions on the use of pensions may partially explain the slowing in
the growth of pensions. However, Ippolito (1986b) concludes that ERISA had
only a small effect on plan terminations.4
Inaddition to the new regulations, the growth in pension coverage may have
slowed simply because workers who were most likely to desire pensions were
already covered. Relatively high current coverage rates among high wage
workers, unionized workers, and employees in large firms imply that further
extension of pension coverage may proceed more slowly in the future.
Patterns of Pension Coverage
The odds that any individual will be covered by a pension plan on his job
vary tremendously with both personal and job characteristics. The most up-to-
date information is reported in the pension supplement to the May 1983 Current
Population Survey (CPS). We restrict the sample to full-time private wage and
salary workers. Those who have jobs which are covered by collective bargaining
agreements are much more likely to be included in a pension plan than nonunion
workers. The coverage rate for private sector workers is 82 percent for union
versus only 44 percent for nonunion workers, as shown in Table 1. Union
contract coverage is correlated with a number of other personal and job
characteristics which in turn are also highly correlated with pension coverage
(e.g., wages, industry). In order to estimate the net effect of union contract
coverage, we estimated a probit equation for pension coverage which included
all of the variables in Table 1. The probit results showed that, other things
equal, those covered by union contracts have a 26.3 percentage point higher
probability of being covered by a pension than nonunion workers.
The size of the workplace (establishment) and the size of the company,
especially the latter, are also important correlates of pension coverage. In
establishments with fewer than 25 workers, only 28 percent of the work force is
covered by a pension plan. Coverage rates jump to 51 percent in establishments5
with 25 to 99 workers and reach 86 percent in establishments with 1,000 or more
workers. The share of workers covered by a pension in companies with fewer
than 25 workers is a paltry 17 percent. This percentage also rises with size,
reaching 80 percent in firms with 1,000 or more employees.
These two size measures are obviously correlated, so it is reasonable to ask
which matters the most. According to the probit analysis, the resounding
answer is company size. Other things equal (including company size), there is
only a 10 percentage point difference between pension coverage probability in
the smallest and largest establishment size categories. In contrast, there is
a 15 percentage point difference between companies with fewer than 25 employees
and those with 25 to 99 employees. This widens to a 45 percentage point
difference between companies with fewer than 25 employees and those with 1,000
or more.
The pattern of pension coverage across different age groups suggests that
workers gradually sort themselves into jobs with pensions over time. Only
about a quarter of workers between 16 and 24 are covered by pensions. Pension
coverage rises to 50 percent for those between 25 and 34; it is slightly above
60 percent for all older workers. Other things equal, the odds of being
covered are 13 percentage points higher for 25 to 34 year olds and 20 to 24
percentage points higher for 35 to 64 year olds than for 16 to 24 year olds.
Although patterns within a cohort over time may be quite different from the
across cohort patterns, they suggest the possibility that if a worker is not
covered by a pension by the time he reaches the 35 to 44 age group, given the
low turnover rates among older workers, there is a good chance he never will be
covered.6
Because of the favorable tax treatment of pensions, it should come as no
surprise that pension coverage is also strongly correlated with average hourly
earnings. The coverage rate for workers earning less than $4 an hour is a mere
13 percent in contrast to coverage rates above 70 percent for those earning $10
an hour or more. Most of this difference cannot be explained by other factors,
as indicated by the probit results.
Workers with jobs in mining, manufacturing, and transportation and utilities
have higher pension coverage rates than those in other industries. However,
much of the difference in coverage rates across industries can be explained in
terms of other factors such as firm size, earnings, and collective bargaining
coverage. For instance, the probit results show that workers in wholesale
trade have a 12 percentage point greater probability of being covered by a
pension than service industry workers, holding all other factors constant. The
difference between workers in durable manufacturing and services turns out to
be even smaller (9 percentage points), despite the fact that the raw,
unadjusted coverage rate for durable manufacturing (72 percent) is much higher
than that for wholesale trade (52 percent).
Table 1 also indicates that pension coverage rates are lower for persons
in service occupations (compared to blue or white collar occupations), lower
for those living in the West, higher for men, higher for married workers, and
higher for high school and college graduates. The magnitude of these
differences is relatively small in relation to the differences in pension
coverage associated with union contract coverage, company size, age, average
hourly earnings, and industry.7
Significance of Pension Benefits and Funds
The growth of pensions over the past four decades has increased their
importance in a number of areas. First, pensions have grown as a source of
income to older Americans. Ippolito (1986a) estimates that the mean initial
pension annuity for 1984 beneficiaries was $6,360 representing 23 percent of
their final earnings. A U.S. Department of Labor Study (1985) reports that the
replacement rate rises with the level of final earnings. Replacement rates for
1978 retirees rose from 14 percent for those with earnings less than $6,000 to
20 percent for those with earnings between $10,000 and $11,999 to 25 percent
for retirees with $14,000 to $19,999 in final earnings. A total of $70 billion
was paid to retirees in pension benefits in 1984. Over the past quarter
century, pension benefits have come to represent an increasing proportion of
retiree income.
Second, pension funds represent a growing proportion of invested funds in
the United States. Ippolito (1986a) estimates that 1984 pension assets totaled
one trillion dollars. These funds represented 22.8 percent of all corporate
equity and 49.9 percent of all corporate bonds. The dramatic rise in pension
funds is shown by comparing these values to their 1950 rates. In 1950,
pensions held less than 1 percent of corporate equity and only 13.1 percent of
all corporate bonds. Another measure of the size of pension assets is that in
1981 pension assets per worker were equal to $10,907 which represented 75
percent of annual earnings.
II. Pension Plan Characteristics
Pension plans are of two basic types: defined contribution and defined
benefit. Within a particular plan type, pensions differ in their plan8
formulas, vesting requirements, maximum benefit provisions, socialsecurity
integration, age of normal and early retirement, reductions for early
retirement, and benefit increases associated with delayed retirement. This
section examines these diverse characteristicsamong pensions and indicates how
these differences affect behavior at the workplace.
Types of Pension Plans
Defined contribution and defined benefit plans are the two basictypes of
pension plans. Defined contribution plans are by far the most commontype of
plan representing 71 percent of all plans in 1984. However, these plans tend
to be provided by relatively small employers. As a result, less than 20
percent of all pension participants are covered by defined contribution plans.
Table 2 shows the greater incidence ofcoverage by defined contribution plans
among small employers. Sixty-three percent of pension participants in nonunion
plans covering less than 100 participants are in defined contributionplans.
This compares to a defined contributioncoverage rate of only 12.9 percent for
small union plans and 0.7 percent for large union plans. Thegreater use of
defined contribution plans among small employers is attributableto lower
administrative costs, plus the tremendous costs of compliance withgovernment
regulations of defined benefit plans for small firms (Smeeding 1983; Mitchell
and Andrews 1981).
In a defined contribution plan, the firm promises to contribute eachperiod
a fixed amount of money to an individual's pension account. In some plans
workers will also be allowed or even required to make contributions. The funds
are invested by the plan and accumulate throughout the worker's life. The
benefit at retirement is determined by the size of the individual'spension
fund at that time. The worker bears all of the riskconcerning the rate of9
return on the invested funds. However, the worker does not risk losing pension
benefits if he leaves the firm prior to retirement or if the company goes out
of business, terminates the pension, or fires the worker. Property rights are
clearly defined; the funds in defined contribution plans belong to the worker.
These plans have no impact on turnover, except for the simple fact that
workers covered by such plans have more total compensation than other workers
if all other variables (including cash earnings) are held constant. They also
have no effect on retirement decisions, except to the extent that workers
face liquidity constraints and are unable to use their benefits as collateral
(in which case they may have to postpone retirement). The key factor to
recognize is that there are no bonuses or penalties associated with the choice
of retirement age in defined contribution plans.
Defined benefit plans are much more common among large employers and as a
result, almost 80 percent of pension participants are covered by defined
benefit plans. These plans are more complex than defined contribution plans
and federal regulations tend to be more restrictive. In a defined benefit
plan, the worker is promised a benefit upon retirement based on plan
generosity, years of service, and in some cases earnings. The firm must set
aside sufficient dollars to provide for these future benefits. The rate of
firm contributions is regulated by the government. As we will explain in
detail below, a worker who leaves prior to the retirement age will lose
benefits relative to the worker who remains with the firm. Thus in these
plans, the worker bears risks associated with plan termination, his own desire
to quit, and potential firing by the firm. However, the firm bears all risks
concerning the rate of return on the pension fund. The use of these plans to
influence turnover and retirement is explored in sections IV and V.10
Plan Characteristics
Several plan characteristics play a critical role in determining benefit
levels, along with any loss of benefits associated with leaving the job. Much
of this discussion is relevant only to defined benefit plans. Theprimary plan
characteristics are reviewed below along with a discussion of economic effects
and the frequency of their use.
Benefit Formula. Defined benefit plans typically use one of three formula
types. The most frequently used formula type is the terminal earnings formula
which determines benefits by multiplying years of service by anaverage of the
final three or five years earnings and a generosity parameter. In the 1983
Employee Benefit Survey of Medium and Large Firms (EBS), plans using these
formulas cover 54 percent of all participants. The career earnings formula is
similar, except that the salary average is based on all earnings with the firm
instead of just the final three or five final years. These plan formulascover
14 percent of participants. Dollar amount formulas providea fixed dollar
amount to all retirees or multiply years of service times a fixed dollar
amount. These formula types cover 28 percent of participants.
Earnings based formulas are used more frequently by plans covering
professional workers and in noncollectively bargained plans. Obviously, these
plans allow for a variance in pension benefits that reflects earnings. Dollar
amount formulas are used more frequently in plans covering production workers
and unionized workers. These formulas tend to reduce the variance of the
benefit distribution relative to the earnings distribution and to flatten the
age-compensation profile of union workers relative to nonunion workers (Allen
and Clark, 1986).11
Vesting. Vesting pertains to the portion of a worker's specified benefit
to which he is legally entitled upon leaving the firm. Prior to 1987,
regulations allowed firms to select one of three vesting rules. These were 100
percent vesting of accrued benefits after 10 years of service, 25 percent
vesting of accrued benefits after 5 years of service with additional vesting
accruing each year until the worker is 100 percent vested after 15 years, and
50 percent vesting of accrued benefits when age and service add up to 45 with
100 percent vesting 5 years later. Almost all companies adopted the 10 year,
100 percent vesting rule (Schulz, 1985). Tax legislation in 1986 altered
vesting standards to be either 100 percent vested after 5 years or graded
vesting with a worker being 50 percent vested after 3 years and accruing
additional vesting each year until he is 100 percent vested after 7 years.
If a worker leaves prior to being vested, he will receive no retirement
benefits. Even if the worker achieves 100 percent vesting, there is still a
penalty for leaving the firm, which we will describe in detail below.
Post-retirement Increases. If pension benefits are not increased after
retirement, their real value will decline in the presence of inflation. Until
recently, it was widely believed that pension benefits were fixed in nominal
terms. Surveys of large firms indicate that less than 5 percent of private
plans automatically increase benefits in response to inflation. The lack of
automatic adjustments does not necessarily imply that no post-retirement
increases are granted. Approximately two-thirds of large plans provided one or
more ad hoc increases during the last half of the 1970s (King, 1982). Allen,
Clark, and Sumner (1986) report that between 1973 and 1979 average benefits for
persons already receiving benefits in 1973 increased by 24 percent during a
period when the Consumer Price Index rose by 63 percent.12
Table 3 shows that benefit increases were larger andmore prevalent in
collectively bargained plans. The method of benefit increase also variedby
collective bargaining status (Allen and Clark, 1986) withbargained plans being
more likely to use methods that provide the largestpercentage increases to
those with the lowest benefits.
Maximum Benefit Provisions. Some pensions incorporate specificplan rules
in order to set a maximum pension benefit. Sometype of maximum benefit
provision is incorporated into pension plans covering 42 percent of
participants represented in the 1983 EBS. The most prevalent form of
limitation to benefits is to limit credited service to aspecific number of
years. This type of limitation is used in plans covering 31 percent of
participants. This limit is usually 30 years or more. Terminal earningsplans
are much more likely to include such limits than plans with othertypes of
benefit formulas. Eleven percent of participants are inplans that limit
benefits to either a maximum percent of terminal orcareer earnings or to a
maximum flat dollar amount.
Social Security Integration. Firms are permitted to reducepension benefits
by including the worker's Social Security benefit as part of totalpension
benefits or costs. Just over half of all participants in the EBSwere in plans
that integrated pension benefits with SocialSecurity benefits. Smaller plans
are more likely to be integrated (President's Commission on PensionPolicy,
1980). Until 1987, the Internal Revenue Service regulations allowed two
types of integration: the excess method and the offset method. The excess
method allows firms to provide greater benefits based onearnings above the
Social Security taxable earnings limit than on earnings below this limit. In
an excess plan which does not consider years of service, the pension benefit13
based on earnings above the specified limit could not exceed 37.5percent of
the plan benefits based on earnings below that level. Plans couldset this
compensation limit no higher than the current year's Social Security taxable
earnings limit. Most plans set the limit well below the allowable amount
and tended not to have adjusted this earnings amount as the SocialSecurity
earning limit rose (Urban Institute, 1982).
The offset method allows a certain portion of the retiree'sprimary
insurance amount (PIA) to be subtracted from the pension benefit. Priorto
1987, the offset could not exceed 83.33 percent of the worker's PIA. Most
surveys indicate that integrated plans did not use the maximum possible
offsets. In offset plans, the most frequently usedpercentage is 50 percent of
the PIA. It remains to be seen how plans will adjust to the 1986tax changes
governing Social Security integration.
Retirement Age and Gains From Continued Employment. Pension plansspecify
an age of normal retirement, which is the time that a worker can retire and
receive full pension benefits as provided by the pension formula. Inrecent
years the age of normal retirement has been lowered in many plans. In the EBS
sample, only 36 percent of the participants were covered by plans using 65 as
the normal retirement age. Another 33 percent were in plans thatspecified
ages between 60 and 64 and 11 percent were in plans with ages between 55 and
59. Approximately 18 percent of plans had no age requirement at all;
eligibility in these plans depends solely on length of service.
Virtually all defined benefit plans allow for retirement prior to the normal
retirement age at reduced benefits. In most plans, the reduction in benefits
is less than the actuarial equivalent of the normal retirement benefit.
Since the 1978 amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, firms14
have not been able to mandatorily retire workers prior to theage of 70. Thus,
workers may continue to work past the normal retirement age. Firms can erect
strong pension incentives for older workers to retire at the normal retirement
age. First, relatively few firms provide any actuarial increase in benefits
for work past the normal retirement age and as a result pension wealthmay fall
after this point. Second, in 1985 approximately half of all participants were
covered by plans that did not continue to credit years of service and earnings
after the date of normal retirement. Thus, the pension is fixed in nominal
terms at the normal retirement age. The worker can continue on the job but
will lose that year's pension benefits.
Legislation enacted in 1986 has altered both the mandatory retirement and
the pension accrual regulations. For most firms, mandatory retirement is now
entirely forbidden as a firm personnel policy regardless of the age of the
worker. In addition, firms providing a pension cannot discontinuewage and
serviceaccrualsat a specified age. These changes reduce the ability of firms
to provide incentives to older workers to retire.
III. Why Do Workers and Unions Want Pensions?
Pension coverage has expanded through the labor force and the magnitude of
pension benefits has increased in response to the actions of various labor
market agents striving to maximize their objective functions. To understand
the development of the pension system, we must determine who the playersare,
what their objectives are, and how pensions can help them achieve their
objectives. These negotiations are conducted in a changing regulatory
environment which alters the incentives associated with the use of a pension.15
The primary agents in bargaining concerning pensions are workers, firms and
unions. Workers seek to maximize total compensation for a given amount
of labor supply or effort. Firms seek to maximize profits. Theobjectives of
unions tend to be more complex and may include reducing income inequality,
providing economic security for workers and retirees, and raising wages and
benefits. The remainder of this section examines how pensions help workers and
unions achieve their primary objectives. Sections IV and V analyze how
pensions affect firm performance.
Worker Utility and the Desire for Pensions
Economic theory assumes that individual workers attempt to maximize utility
subject to their personal budget constraint. A simplified version of this
maximization process has the worker's utility as a function of total
compensation and the amount of labor supplied. For a given amount of labor
supplied, the worker seeks to maximize total compensation. Compensationmay
come in many forms other than current cash such as job safety, comfort on the
job, and all types of employee benefits including pensions.
For the purposes of this part of the discussion, assume that the firm is a
neutral agent and is willing to sell the worker any type of benefit at a price
that is equal to the firm's cost of acquiring this benefit. The workerpays
for each benefit by receiving less in cash compensation. Theoretically this
compensating differential would allow the worker to buy the desired amount of
any benefit offered by the firm. The worker would purchase benefits until the
marginal utility of this benefit was equal to marginal value of a dollar of
cash spent on other goods and services (Rosen 1974). With no taxes or other
governmental interference, benefits would be bought only if the firm can buy16
these goods at a lower cost than the worker could purchase them in the market
or if the benefit is tied to the job and can only be bought from the firm.
Neither of these explanations for the existence of fringe benefits seem to
apply in the case of pensions. Today, there are financial intermediaries which
give individuals access to a wide spectrum of investment opportunities; workers
are not required to save through a pension to gain access to financial
markets. The diversity of investment opportunities available to individuals
also makes it unlikely that the expected rate of return to pension funds is
greater than the expected rate of return that an individual investor could
receive.
During the early development of the pension system these conditionsmay not
have prevailed. Prior to the development of large mutual funds, small
investors may have been unable to obtain widespread diversification.
Therefore, capital market regulations and institutions may have played a role
in the initial growth of pensions. Even today theremay remain differences in
transactions costs associated with individual investments versus investment
through a pension fund. Despite this potential offset, it seems highly
unlikely that the widespread pension coverage in today's economy can be
explained in terms of lower transactions costs.
A much more convincing rationale is the tax status of pensions in comparison
to current earnings. Firms with qualified plans make tax deductible
contributions to a pension fund that is used to provide future benefits to
current workers. The value of these contributions is not viewed as current
compensation to the worker and therefore is not subject to the individual
income tax in the current period. The return to assets in these funds is also
not taxable. Instead, benefits are taxed when they are received and the17
expectation is that the worker will be in a lower tax bracket at that time.
Prior to the advent of Individual Retirement Accounts, workers had no other
form of savings that received such preferential tax treatment.
Pension contributions by firms are also exempt from Social Security and
Unemployment Insurance payroll taxes. For the worker the value of pension
contributions permanently escapes the employee's share of the Social Security
tax, although the resulting lower earnings means that future Social Security
benefits will also be lower. Given today's benefit structure, the expected
loss in benefits will be less than the savings from reduced taxes and the
worker's lifetime income will rise.
As a result of the differential tax treatment, workers could increase total
compensation by agreeing with the firmtoestablish a pension plan. The value
of a pension plan is dependent on the prevailing tax rate. Thus, as tax rates
rise, more workers would be expected to request their firms to institute a
pension. The tax effect is also an important determinant of the distribution
of plans across workers in any given year. High wage workers are much more
likely to be covered by a plan than low wage workers, as shown in Table 1.
Union Objectives and the Use of Pensions
Unions have played an important independent role in the expansion of pension
coverage and the development of certain pension characteristics. Historically,
unions have consistently exerted pressure on both employers and governments to
provide economic security for older workers through both private pensions and
Social Security. Private pension plans became much more widespread after the
Inland Steel decision made pensions a permissible topic for collective
bargaining. Even today workers who are covered by collective bargaining18
agreements are much more likely than other workers to receive a pension when
they retire.
Despite the difficulties associated with defining union objectives in
precise terms, it is quite clear that pensions can help achievemany possible
union objectives. First, the preferences of older, more senior workersreceive
much more weight in determining the terms of the employment contract under
unionism. These workers prefer a compensation package with lowerwages and
higher retirement income, holding the cost of the package constant. Asa
result of the greater weight given to their preferences, thepackage becomes
more likely to contain a pension along with other provisions which increase the
income and economic security of older workers. Second,pensions can be used to
compress the distribution of total compensation among union members. Allen and
Clark (1986) show how the choice of benefitparameters can reduce pension
inequality among workers.
Third, pensions can serve the interests of union officers. Albert Rees
(1962) argued that by obtaining a new benefit for their members, union leaders
can gain much more credit for innovation than they would if they had obtaineda
wage increase of equal value. In cases where the union has some control over
the pension plan, the scope of authority of theleadership is significantly
greater as well. Fourth, unions have an organizational advantage in certain
aspects of pension administration. For instance unions often administer plans
in industries with small employers or short job durations. Withoutunions
there probably would not be very many workers covered byprivate pensions in
the construction industry. Unions also monitor plan behaviorso that employers
do not renege on explicit or implicit contracts.Finally, higher wages place19
union members in higher marginal tax brackets, thereby increasing the demand
for all forms of tax-free or tax-deferred compensation, including pensions.
IV. What Is The Pension Contract?
The influence of pension plans on firm performance depends on the nature of
the pension contract and how this contract is evaluated by the worker and the
firm. Two models of pension contracts have been developed in the economics
literature. The first is primarily based on the work of Bulow (1982) who
derived the value of pensions under a strict legal or explicit contract. This
model assumes that a worker considers only the value of benefits that a firm is
legally required to pay if the worker were to leave the firm at the end of the
current period. This model clearly applies to defined contribution plans and
many contend that it applies to defined benefit plans as well. The second
model, developed in recent work by Ippolito (l985a, l986a) and others, allows
for the existence of implicit long term employment contracts and focuses on the
role of defined benefit plans in such contracts.This model assumes that a.
worker views the employment contract as an implicit promise by the firm to
retain the worker (subject to performance requirements) until retirement and to
pay a benefit based on final pay.
These models yield different predictions concerning incentives for the worker
to quit and incentives for the worker to provide a high level of job
performance to minimize risks of being fired. In addition, these theories of
the pension contract predict alternative patterns of life cycle compensation.
In this section, each of these models is examined in detail and the
corresponding relationship with firm performance is assessed. The final20
objective of this section is to analyze the role of collectivebargaining in
models of the pension contract.
The Extlicit Contract View of Pensions
The basic premise of the explicit contract model is that workersact as if
the employment contract is for only one period. Ofcourse, if both parties are
agreeable employment may be continued on a period by period basis. Since the
worker knows that he may be terminated at the end of thecurrent period, he is
unwilling to accept any compensation that is contingent on his remaining with
the firm for an extended period of time. Thistype of contract implies that
the worker will value future retirement benefitson the basis of work to date
and will consider only benefits that the firm islegally required to pay.
Under explicit employment contracts, workers face no loss in futurebenefits
if they quit their current job. As a result, pensions cannot beused to reduce
turnover or encourage a higher level of job performance.Despite the lack of a
capital loss associated with leaving a job, pensions stillrepresent an
important component of compensation and will affect the growth rate ofearnings
of a worker covered by a pension. In addition,coverage by a pension alters
the cash wage offer necessary to entice a worker to leave hispresent job. To
understand these effects, a brief discussion of the evaluation ofpension
wealth is necessary along with the related concept of annualpension
compensation.
The expected present value of future pension benefits,pension wealth, is
determined by finding the discounted value of a life annuitybeginning at
retirement. The magnitude of the annual flow is governed by the pension
formula and the individual's own work history. The most frequent form of21
benefit formula is one where the benefit is determined by multiplying the
number of years of service by a fixed percentage of the worker'saverage
earnings during the final years of employment. Pension wealth is calculated by
using the worker's current years of service and salary average along with the
prevailing benefit formula. These values, along with assumptions concerning
survival probabilities and the market interest rate, are sufficient to
calculate pension wealth for any worker.
Pension compensation is the change in pension wealth resulting from
continued employment. From the above discussion, one can see that pension
wealth rises due to an additional year of service and to any increase in
earnings. Mathematical derivations of pension compensation are found in Bulow
(1982), Clark and McDermed (1986a) and Kotlikoff and Wise (1985). These papers
illustrate that if earnings are rising with tenure, pension compensationgrows
more rapidly than earnings.
The explicit contract literature assumes that in each year a worker is paid
total compensation equal to the value of his output. With perfect capital
markets, the cost to the firm of funding pension benefits is the same as the
value that the worker places on these benefits. If there are no other forms of
compensation, the wage plus pension compensation will equal the worker's
output. With pension compensation growing more rapidly than earnings, pension
compensation will increase as a proportion of total compensation as the worker
continues on the job. This lifetime pattern of compensation is shown in Table
4.
Under the explicit contract model, pension wealth and pension compensation
are zero until the worker is vested in the pension plan. After vesting but
still during the early working years, pension compensation is small both in22
absolute terms and as a percentage of total compensation. If the worker
remains on the job, pension compensation grows rapidly andmay reach 30 to 50
percent of total compensation during the final working years prior to
retirement. This increase in pension compensation produces acorresponding
growth in pension wealth to which the worker is legally entitled.
Although there is no loss in pension wealth if the worker leaves his job,
pensions still affect the wage offer from a competing firm that isnecessary to
entice the worker to leave his current job. A competing firm that hasno
pension must offer a cash wage equal to the worker's current earnings plus
pension compensation. Even if the competing firm has a pension that is
identical to the one on the worker's current job, thewage offer must exceed
current earnings. This follows because pension compensation will be loweron
the new job, either because the worker will not be vestedor because he will
have fewer years of service on the new job.
This discussion would seem to indicate that under theexplicit contract
model pensions would tend to reduce turnover by raising the reservationwage at
other firms. This is an incorrect inference. Since the modelassumes a spot
market with all firms willing to pay total compensationequal to the worker's
marginal product, competing firms are willing to pay the higher cashwage
solely because they are not providing as much pension compensation.
Several important predictions can be derived from this model.First, there
is no pension loss from leaving the job so pensions should not reducequit
rates. For the same reason, pensions cannot be used as a personnelpolicy to
encourage reduced worker malfeasance. Second, workers covered by pensions
should have a flatter age-earnings profile than workers who receive their
entire compensation in cash. In addition, Bulow (1982) has shown thatearnings23
should exhibit discrete jumps at several times associated with largechanges in
pension compensation. For instance at vesting, pension compensation goes from
zero to hundreds of dollars. Assuming no similar increase in the value of the
worker's output takes place, wages must adjust in the opposite direction.
There should be no ad hoc post-retirement increases in benefits for workers
covered by an explicit contract. For the most part, these predictions are
contradicted by the available evidence.
The Inrnlicit Contract View of Pensions
An alternative to the single period contract described above is a long term
employment contract which requires future payment for current labor services.
Terms of such contracts may be either explicit as in formal contracts or
implicit. Recently, a series of papers by Lazear (1979, 1981, 1983, 1986) and
Malcolmson (1984) have pointed out how Implicit labor contracts can be used to
modify worker behavior and improve firm performance. Pensions can be an
important component of these contracts. The key factor in the use of pensions
in an implicit contract is the difference in the implied value of pension
wealth if the worker remains with the firm until retirement and the actual
value of the pension if the worker leaves prior to fulfilling the terms of the
contract.
Firms and workers may enter into an implicit contract in order to reduce
labor turnover and increase the level of worker productivity. These objectives
are accomplished by imposing a wealth loss on workers who quit the firm prior
to the end of the contract or who are fired due to shirking on the job. The
wealth loss is produced by assuming that the worker is paid each period total24
compensation equal to his output; however, the value of the compensation
is conditional on the worker continuing to meet the terms of thecontract.
Pension compensation comprises the conditional component of total
compensation. In this model, pension wealth is based on the worker's
expectation that he will remain with the firm until he retires. As such, the
expected pension benefit is based on his projected final earnings. The
difference between the calculation of pension wealth using theimplicit
contract method and the explicit contract model is the use of projected final
earnings instead of current earnings to determine the value of current pension
wealth. The use of projected earnings will produce a higher estimate of
pension wealth.
In an implicit contract, the worker receives pension compeiisation basedon
the change in pension wealth as calculated using projectedearnings. In this
case, pension wealth increases only because of additional years of service.
Pension compensation will be greater than under the explicit contractearly in
life, but will not rise as rapidly with years of service. Ippolito (l985a)
has shown that under certain conditions pension compensation willrepresent a
constant proportion of total compensation throughout work life.
The worker is assumed to pay for a pension conditional onremaining with the
firm until retirement. If he leaves the firm, his actual pension will be
considerably smaller than the pension he was paying for in the form of reduced
earnings. Thus, termination of the employment contract imposes a capital loss
on the worker. This capital loss equals the difference between pension wealth
based on projected earnings and pension wealth under the legal method.
Formulas for calculating the capital loss are reported in Ippolito (1985a) and
Allen, Clark, and McDermed (1986).25
The existence of this potential loss will make the worker less likely to
quit and more likely to perform at a level that will not tempt the firm to fire
him. The value of this capital loss rises during the early workyears and then
begins to decline as the worker approaches the age of retirement. An example
of this effect is shown in Table 5. For many workers, the loss in pension
wealth associated with quitting may represent half of annual earnings or with
high rates of inflation perhaps as much as a full year's earnings (Ippolito,
(l985b, 1987), Allen, Clark and McDermed, (1986)).
The implicit contract model generates several predictions concerning
earnings and worker performance. First, workers covered by a pension should be
less likely to quit and should be more willing to provide a high level of
effort to reduce the probability of being fired. Second, the rate of growth
of earnings for workers covered by a pension should be approximately the same
as the growth of earnings of similar workers not covered by a pension.
Available evidence seems to support the latter prediction (Clark and McDermed,
l986b; Mitchell and Pozzebon 1986: Ippolito, l985a): evidence on turnover is
examined in detail in Section VI.
The Pension Contract under Collective Bargaining
The impact of unionism on any pension contract, whether explicit or
implicit, hinges on the decision making process within the union and how
various groups exert their influence on the determination of the bargaining
agreement. In the simple "monopoly union" framework, there is only one
prediction about union impact: pension plans should be more generous in all
respects. This means higher initial benefits, larger increases in benefits26
after retirement, earlier eligibility for benefits, and fewer restrictions on
participation and vesting.
Public choice models recognize the conflicts within the union concerning
the division of monopoly rents. Despite the well known difficulties involved
with specifying the political mechanisms at work, two of the most tractable
public choice approaches yield the prediction that the pension contract will
be tilted in favor of older workers. Freeman (1985) has shown formally that in
a median voter approach, the pension contract will be written to match the
preferences of inframarginal workers, whereas in a nonunion setting, it will
be written to match the preferences of the marginal worker.
The inframarginal worker is likely to be older and more attached to the firm
than the marginal worker. As a result, the union firm is more likely to havea
pension plan and that plan is likely to have provisions which older, less
mobile workers will find attractive. In particular, Freemanargues that unions
are more likely to adopt a defined benefit rather than a defined contribution
plan and that union plans will have stricter provisions for eligibility and
portability. Under both of these provisions, persons who leave the firm
subsidize those who stay. The political dominance of older workers in union
politics need not result from median voter characteristics; autocracy rather
than democracy may very well be a better rationale. This approach stillyields
the same answer to pension issues as the median voter approach -- morepensions
under unionism and the adoption of pension contract provisions favorable to
older workers.
Unions can also change the terms of the pension contract so as to
redistribute income within and across cohorts of workers. This objective
serves union interests by promoting worker solidarity and eliminating compen-27
sation cost differences as a basis for competition among employers. Standard
wage rate policies help reduce income differences between older and younger
workers and between skilled and unskilled workers. Their counterparts in the
pension contract is the use of benefit formulas which give all workers either
the same flat benefit or the same dollar amount of benefits for each year of
service. Pension benefits are very rarely based on earnings in a plan covered
by collective bargaining. Allen and Clark (1986) show that the impact of both
earnings and years of service on pension benefits within a cohort of retirees
is much smaller for union than nonunion beneficiaries. In addition, unions
equalize pension wealth across cohorts by giving proportionally larger
post-retirement increases to those who have been retired the longest.
Regardless of whether the pension contract is implicit or explicit, these
considerations lead us to expect that collectively bargained plans will differ
from nonbargained plans. A difficulty which arises in many types of implicit
contracts is that in certain situations one party stands to gain from violating
the contract. For instance post-retirement adjustments seem to be part of an
implicit contract under which firms reduce uncertainty about the plan's rate of
return and the impact of inflation in return for lower wages or lower
benefits. Firms have an incentive to renege on such a contract because the
worker pays for the insurance but has no legal title to claim post-retirement
increases promised by the firm. In general, one would expect that firms would
weigh the short-term gains from breaking the agreement against the reputational
costs. Even if a firm currently faces large reputational costs for breaking
implicit contracts, there still is a chance that the reputational costs will
become smaller at some point in the future.28
These difficulties decrease the probability that certain types of implicit
contracts will be written without some form of outside enforcement. Unions can
play an important role in this regard. As long as it is in the interests of the
union, it can raise the cost of violating such implicit agreements well above
the cost of a diminished reputation. Since both sides recognize this, it
becomes easier to write such contracts in a collective bargaining situation.
Ippolito (1985c) has argued that the pension contract plays a completely
different role under collective bargaining -- thatof a bond which the union
posts to guarantee the survival of the firm. With fixed investments in physical
and human capital, the firm faces the risk of a "holdup" by the union (in the
form of higher wage demands or lower productivity) when it starts to receive
the returns from those investments. Without some insurance against this
possibility, the firm will be unable to attract capital and provide jobs for
union members. Ippolito claims that underfunded pension plans provide this
insurance. Under this setup, should the union ever decide to stage a holdup,
its members lose the portion of their pensions which has not been funded and
which is not insured by the PBGC. All parties gain from such anarrangement
because holdups become unlikely, allowing the firm to make profits and the
union members to collect rents.
Ippolito's model predicts that union members are more likely to be covered
by pension plans than nonunion workers and that such plans are more likely to
be underfunded than nonunion plans. This also means that defined contribution
plans will not be adopted under unionism because such plans are by definition
always fully funded. The role of past service credits for older workers in
this framework is to make them more concerned about the financial wellbeing of29
the firm. The prediction about underfunding is the distinctive feature of this
model.
In a subsequent paper, Ippolito (1986b) argues that virtually all systematic
underfunding in private pension plans in the United States is attributable to
underfunded plans covering unionized participants. He argues that the union
tendency to "holdup" firms and the response of firms to underfund plans was one
of the principal reasons for organized labor's support for passage of ERISA,
including the insuring of pension benefits through the PBGC. He concludes that
the resulting system provided large transfers to unionized workers. This
follows from the tendency toward underfunding and the fact that the overall
probability of plan sponsor failure during 1978 through 1983 was 1.4 percent
while the probability for firms that were 100 percent unionized was almost 200
percent higher. PBGC data shows that almost 95 percent of the monies
transferred through the pension insurance system have been claimed by union
participants. Participants covered by the United Automobile Workers and the
Steelworkers of America received 63 percent of these transfers.
V. Pensions and Employee Behavior
The characteristics of the pension contract outlined above have predict-
able consequences for certain types of employee behavior. It has long been
recognized that pensions should and do reduce employee turnover. In the
explicit contract framework, the observed correlation between pension coverage
and low turnover occurs because workers who are vested in their pension receive
more compensation than other workers, other things equal. In the implicit
contract approach, pensions reduce turnover by imposing a tax on workers who30
leave the firm. This tax can be imposed through vesting rules which prevent
workers who leave the firm before a given number of years from receiving a
pension. It can also be imposed through benefit formulas based on final
earnings. For instance, consider a case where a worker earns $20,000 after 20
years and $40,000 after 40 years in the labor market and is covered by a
pension plan which will annually pay him 1.5 percent of final earnings for each
year of service when he retires. If he stays at the same job throughout this
period, his annual benefit will be $24,000 (.015 x 40 x 40,000). However if he
switches jobs after his 20th year, his benefit will be only $18,000 (.015 x 20
x 20,000 +.015x 20 x 40,000). Recognizing this, the worker becomes less
likely to leave the firm because the benefit formula rewards those who
stay. The incentive to stay is even greater in periods of rapid inflation
because benefits are based on historical earnings unadjusted for inflation.
In addition to the direct incentives which vesting and earnings-based
benefit formulas provide for any employee to stay with the firm, these pension
characteristics will also influence the type of employee which the firm is
able to attract. Consider the following simple example. Suppose there are two
types of workers with quit probabilities p and q respectively, with p >q.
These differences could arise from expected differences in the value of
nonmarket time over the life cycle or differences in mobility costs. A firm
which must invest a great deal in worker-specific training will want to
attract the worker with the lower quit probability. This can be done by
setting up a compensation schedule which includes a pension with delayed
vesting and an earnings based formula. This will simultaneously discourage the
p-applicants and encourage the q-applicants. The result is a set of employees
with lower initial odds of leaving the firm. post whenever these employees31
consider leaving the firm, the financial incentives created by vesting and the
benefit formula will discourage many of them from doing so. This argument is
presented formally and with several interesting extensions in Viscusi (1980,
1985).
As a form of deferred compensation, pensions can also be used as part of
a scheme to discourage workers from shirking. Lazear (1979, 1981) has showed
how deferred compensation results in workers being paid less than their
marginal product during their initial years with the firm and more than their
marginal product in their final years. The underpayment in the initial years
is equivalent to the posting of a bond for good performance. Workers who
shirk must forfeit the bond as well as the ability to collect the returns to
the bond in the future. This compensation scheme benefits workers because they
end up with higher productivity over their lifetime and thus with more
income. Lazear shows how the combination of a pension payable upon retirement
and an age-earnings profile which is steeper than the age-productivity profile
produces this result.
One problem which arises when firms adopt payment systems where workers
receive more than their marginal product in their later years is that they
have an incentive to stay with the firm too long. "Too long" in this context
means that if the worker was actually paid his marginal product rather than a
premium above his marginal product, he would choose to retire or work else-
where. Lazear (1979) shows that mandatory retirement results in more efficient
separation decisions by removing this adverse incentive. Pensions can also be
used to encourage workers to make efficient separation decisions by acting as
a form of severance pay, as shown in Lazear (1983). If the provisions for early
retirement benefits are sufficiently generous, pension compensation (the32
change in pension wealth attributable to staying an extra year with the firm)
becomes negative, making total compensation (earnings plus pension compensa-
tion) equal marginal product and thereby eliminating the incentive to stay
"too long."
Thiscan explain the frequent use of "sweetened" early retirement benefits
in companies which must reduce employment, especially if the cost of the
sweeter benefits is less than the cost of layoffs (e.g., difficulties in
attracting workers in the future, higher payroll taxes). Typically, firms will
offer a retirement "window", i.e. a short time period during which workers
can retire under special terms. These programs often add years to a person's
age and job tenure for the purpose of calculating pension benefits.
Pensions also encourage certain types of behavior which are detrimental
to the firm. It is not inconceivable that pensions may reduce turnover too
much. The pension loss associated with leaving a firm will keep some workers
in jobs that they do not like and for which they are not well suited. This is
especially likely in companies where opportunities for individual advancement
turn out to be less than what employees expected.
There is also usually very little connection between pension benefits and
worker performance. Pension wealth depends either on length of service or
length of service and earnings. In the former case, performance affects
pension wealth only to the extent that the pension discouraged the worker from
engaging in behavior for which he would have been dismissed. In the latter
case, the pension-performance connection depends entirely upon the linkages
between earnings and performance. Unless those linkages are quite strong, the
rational worker will regard pension compensation as a fixed element in the
compensation package, just like health insurance and paid holidays.33
By reducing the pay differentials across different jobs within an
organization, pensions limit the ability of managers to use those differen-
tials to obtain skills needed for advancement or to use the pay system to award
certain types of behavior. For instance, Allen (1981) uses a simple labor
supply model to show how an increased share of employee benefits in the
compensation package creates an incentive for excessive absenteeism.
Thus, the overall impact of pensions on employee behavior has both desirable
and undesirable consequences for the firm. Firms with pensions should have
lower turnover rates, which will save them the costs of finding and training
replacements. Early retirement benefits can also be used to encourage people to
leave the firm when their marginal product has fallen below their
earnings. There is some risk, however, that turnover may fall too much and that
many workers in the middle of their careers may stay in jobs which they do not
like for fear of losing future pension benefits. Workers covered by pensions
will be less likely to shirk, for fear of getting fired and losing some of the
pension wealth they would have received if they had not lost their job. This is
offset by the fact that the risk of getting fired is about the only linkage
between pension compensation and worker performance.
Regulatory Environment
The overall impact of pensions on firm performance will be influenced by
regulation. Most pension regulations deal with purely financial matters which
can be ignored in the present context. Nonetheless certain pension regulations
constrain the choices made by workers and firms and thus influence outcomes. At
the most obvious level, pensions would be a much less popular form of compensa-
tion if they were not tax-exempt. Beyond that, the Employee Retirement Income34
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) contains certain provisions which are likely to
be relevant. First, ERISA sets minimum vesting standards. Underpast
regulations, most firms choose to provide complete vesting after 10 years of
service. It is doubtful that this has much effect on turnover in light of the
very low rates of turnover among workers with 10 or more years of service who
are not covered by pensions (Allen, Clark, and McDermed (1986)). Second, ERISA
makes it difficult for firms to restrict pensioncoverage to particular
individuals. This probably has some impact on firms which are just on the
margin of having a pension plan. Third, ERISA imposes limits on underfunding of
pension plans and requires firms to pay for plan termination insurance. This
would limit the ability of firms to use pensions to stop union holdups.
VI. Evidence on Pensions and Firm Performance
Pensions are most likely to influence employee behavior by raising
productivity and by influencing labor mobility. The impact of pensions on the
overall financial well-being of the firm depends on themonetary value of these
effects. It also depends upon how pensions affect the overall size of the
compensation package. If there is not a dollar for dollar tradeoff (after
taxes) between pensions and other forms of compensation; then firms with
pensions will have higher labor costs than firms without pensions and firms
with pensions will be at a competitive disadvantage, unless there issome
offsetting productivity or cost differential in their favor. This section
begins by summarizing previous evidence and reporting some new evidence on
compensating wage differentials for pensions. The first evidence regarding the
impact of pensions on productivity levels, productivity growth rates, and35
profitability is then reported. This direct evidence is inconclusive. To gain
further insights, the final part of this section summarizes evidence on
indirect mechanisms through which pensions can affect productivity such as
turnover, retirement, and absenteeism.
Compensating Wage Differentials for Pensions
Testing for wage-pension tradeoffs has always been a very tricky busi-
ness. The data sets which are usually employed by economists report wages or
earnings, but they do not report pension compensation. This latter variable
can be reported only by employers and even here it is not clear theoretically
which concept (legal or projected earnings) of pension compensation should be
used. There is a further problem with reverse causality. Workers with high
earnings are also in high tax brackets and thus should want a larger share of
their income in the form of pension compensation. Anyone who puts wages on
the left hand side and estimated pension compensation on the right hand side
of an OLS equation should not expect glowing referee reports. This problem is
further exacerbated by the fact that in defined benefit plans with
earnings-based formulas, pension compensation is a direct function of
earnings. Lastly, it is very difficult to hold all other relevant factors
constant. The critical omitted variables include other forms of compensation
as well as a set of variables which will in effect hold either employee
utility or firm profitability constant so that a true wage-pension tradeoff
can be estimated.
A few studies have developed procedures which overcome some of these
problems; their estimates are summarized in Table 6. Out of the six studies,
only two contain any evidence that wages drop by the amount of pension
compensation: Schiller and Weiss (1980) got this result for the 45-54 age36
group in a 1969 sample which matched a Labor Department file of pension
plan characteristics (including benefit formulas) with a Social Security
earnings history file for males in those companies whose benefits were vested
and Smith (1981) estimated a compensating differential for non-uniformed
government workers in a sample of 58 cities and counties in Pennsylvania in
1976. The results in Schiller and Weiss for other age groups provide little in
the way of additional confirmation. They find a weak negative tradeoff between
wages and pensions for the 26-34 and 35-39 age groups, a weak positive tradeoff
for the 40-44 age group, and no tradeoff for the 55-64 age group; all of these
estimates are very imprecise. The only other study to directly test for
compensating wage differentials by putting pension compensation on the
right-hand side of the equation is Smith and Ehrenberg (1983), which found no
evidence of a wage-pension tradeoff. The other three studies tested for such a
tradeoff by using proxies for pension compensation; they also found no evidence
that pensions reduce wages.
One limitation which all of these studies face is that they use indivi-
dual characteristics as proxies for worker productivity. With industry data,
one can include productivity directly as a right-hand side variable. This is
done in Table 7, where the log of average hourly earnings for workers in
3-digit manufacturing industries in the May 1983 CPS are regressed on a set of
standard control variables (hours, age, schooling, union, establishment size,
tenure, marital status, race, and sex) and then a productivity measure (value
added per hour) is added to the equation. In the first model, average hourly
earnings are 38 percent higher in industries where all workers are covered by
pensions than in industries where no workers are covered by pensions. This
earnings difference drops to 35 percent when the productivity variable is37
added to the model. Thus, adding productivity to the set of right-hand side
variables does not shed any new insights. Equations estimated over full time
private wage and salary workers in the May 1983 CPS produce sharply lower
estimates of the wage premium which workers with pensions receive (16 to 19
percent) This suggests that aggregation may be contaminating the estimates
obtained from industry data, but it is clearly not creating enough bias to
reverse the direction of the estimate.
In summary, the empirical evidence on wage-pension tradeoffs is quite
clear. Most estimates of compensating wage differentials for pension coverage
show that wages do not drop dollar-for-dollar with increases in pension
compensation. Firms with pensions pay higher compensation to their current
workers. Thus, the empirical studies suggest that firms must have higher
productivity or receive some cost savings elsewhere in order to survive in
markets with firms which do not have pensions. Of course, another plausible
explanation is that these studies have been unable to accurately estimate the
true pension compensating wage differential. A final conclusion on the
magnitude of any compensating differential awaits better theory or better data.
Pensions. Productivity and Profits
As pointed out in Section V, pensions can potentially increase productiv-
ity by reducing turnover and shirking and by producing efficient retirement
decisions. These positive effects may be offset by excessively low turnover
rates, higher absenteeism, and the weaker linkage between performance and pay
that is generated by many pension plans. To determine whether pensions do
have any impact on productivity, we merged data for 3-digit manufacturing
industries from the 1983 Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM) with pension38
coverage data for those industries from the May 1983 CPS. The production
function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale. The
productivity measure is the log of value added per hour. It is regressed on
the log of the capital-labor ratio and the fraction of workers in each industry
who participate in an employer or union sponsored pension plan, along with a
set of 20 binary variables indicating 2-digit industry. We also included a set
of six additional control variables: ratio covered by union contracts, ratio
in establishments with fewer than 25 employees, ratio with less than oneyear
of service with their employer (new hires), average years of schooling, and
average age. After experimenting with a variety of specifications, we found
that the impact of pension coverage on productivity varied with union contract
coverage, average age, and the share of employees who are new hires. Thus, we
added interaction terms between each of these variables and pensioncoverage.
To estimate the impact of the size of pension benefits on productivity, we also
included an interaction term between pension coverage and the log ofaverage
hourly earnings. The results are reported in Table 8 with and without the
interaction terms.
In the specification without interaction terms (column 1 in Table 8),
productivity is 25.3 percent lower in industries with high pension coverage
rates, but the impact of pension coverage is not statistically different from
zero. In fact, productivity is uncorrelated with most variables in the model,
except for the capital-labor ratio and average weekly hours.
The results for the specification containing the interaction terms show a
much more complex relationship between productivity, pensioncoverage, and the
other right hand side variables. The impact of pension coverage on
productivity clearly varies with average hourly earnings, union contract39
coverage, average age of workers, and the share of workers who are new hires.
Pensions are more likely to have a positive impact on productivity in
industries with high earnings, a small share of workers covered by union
contracts, a small ratio of new hires to employment, or a large share of young
workers. At the across-industry means of these variables, productivity is
35.3 percent lower in industries where all workers are covered by pensions than
in industries where no workers are covered. Pension coverage is correlated
with greater productivity in industries where union contract coverage is below
12.6 percent, where fewer than 6.8 percent of all employees are new hires and
where coverage age is below 35.4 percent. (The across-industry means of these
variables are 30.5 percent, 14.1 percent, and 38.5 percent). On balance, these
results show that in the average industry pensions have no effect on
productivity, but pensions are associated with hither productivity in nonunion
industries with low new hire rates, high wages, and younger workers.
A related measure of firm performance is productivity growth. In most
studies of productivity growth done by economists, the focus is usually on the
impact of such variables as research intensity, concentration ratios, and
collective bargaining. The impact of human resources policies on innovative
activity has not been carefully explored. To the extent that pensions help
mold long terni economic security among the workforce, they may also encourage
innovation.
The Labor Department calculates productivity growth indexes for a set of
4-digit industries where output can be measured in physical units. The ratio
of the 1983 to the 1972 values of the productivity index was regressed on
pension coverage to estimate the impact of pension coverage on productivity
growth and the results are shown in Table 9. Pension coverage data from the40
beginning of the period are unavailable. To establish the robustness of the
findings, we constructed pension coverage rates by 3-digit industry from the
1979 as well as the 1983 May CPS. Also included as control variables were
percentage union members in 1973-75, the change in unionization between 1973-75
and 1984, the 1972 four firm concentration ratio, the difference between the
1982 and the 1972 concentration ratio, and the ratio of R&D used by the
industry to value added. The sample consists of 73 industries.
When pension coverage in 1983 appears on the right-hand side of the
equation, 1972-1983 productivity growth is 32 percentage points greater in
industries where workers are covered by pensions than in industries where
workers are not covered. However, this estimate is barely larger than its
standard error. Further, when 1979 coverage rates are used instead, there is
no correlation between pension coverage and productivity growth. Productivity
growth is faster in industries which are concentrated, in industries where
concentration ratios are rising, and in industries with high ratios of R&D to
output. Pension coverage does not seem to affect productivity growth.
The final indicator of the impact of pensions on firm performance which
we examined was profitability. This variable can be measured in the 1983
ASM data in two different ways. Profits equal value added less depreciation,
total payroll (including benefits and Social Insurance), and rental capital.
The estimated rate of return on assets equals profits divided by the gross
book value of capital at the end of the year. The price cost margin equals
profits divided by value added. Both variables were regressed on the same
sets of control variables which were used in the productivity level equations
in Table 8 and the results are reported in Table 10.41
Industries with high pension coverage rates seem to have the same profit
rates as industries with low coverage rates. In the specifications without
pension interactions (columns 1 and 3), each profit measure is 12 to 13
percentage points higher when all workers are covered by pensions than when
none are, but neither estimate is significantly different from zero. When the
interaction terms with pension coverage are added in columns 2 and 4, the
average rate of return on assets is 4 percentage points lower in the average
industry if it has full pension coverage than if it has no pension coverage,
whereas the price-cost margin is 8 percentage points higher if it has full
pension coverage. Neither estimate is statistically significant. Except for
the age interaction in the rate of return equation, the signs of the
interaction terms in both profit equations are the same as in the productivity
equations. Thus, the profit equations also indicate that pensions are more
likely to enhance firm performance in nonunion industries with relatively few
new hires and a younger workforce.
Profit rates should be lower in industries with high coverage rates if
pensions raise labor costs but do not raise productivity. Why are these
results contradictory? The first suspect is always the data, in this case the
ASM data used to estimate the productivity and profit equations. In the data's
defense, we note that there was a very strong positive correlation between
productivity and the capital-labor ratio and that the coefficient of the
capital-labor ratio was always near capital's share of output in manufacturing
(all coefficients were between .42 and .44). Perhaps the pension coverage
rates from the CPS contained too much measurement error, but restrictions on
the sample to industries were more than 30 observations for each 3-digit42
industry cell did not affect the results. This leads us to believe that the
data are not the problem.
Another possibility is the empirical model. We used pension coverage but
could not take into account variation in the size of pension compensation
across different industries. Based on our studies of pension benefit formulas
across different industries, we find it hard to believe that this is contami-
nating our results. Benefit parameters do not vary all that much among
manufacturing firms with common formula types. Differences in other pension
characteristics, such as age of eligibility for early or normal benefits, may
be important in this regard, but study of any of these questions awaits better
data.
One final way to resolve this contradiction is to examine variables which
are believed to affect productivity, although the exact magnitude of their
impact is unknown. We do this in the final part of this section, focusing on
the evidence on pensions and turnover.
Indirect Evidence on Pensions and Productivity
All of the available evidence shows that pensions reduce turnover. Mitchell
(1982) tested the effect of pension coverage on quits and job changes using the
longitudinal sample from the 1973 and 1977 Quality of Employment Survey. She
found that men were 10 percent less likely to quit if they were covered by a
pension plan. Pension coverage had a smaller and statistically insignificant
effect on quits among females. Job changes were much less likely to occur
among both males and females covered by a pension. Taking into account the
simultaneity between wage offers and quits, Mitchell (1983) obtains similar
results: pension coverage lowers the quit rate for males but has no significant43
effect on the quit rate for females. The impact of pensions on mobility has
also been studied over a sample of United Kingdom data by McCormick and Hughes
(1984). They also find that pensions reduce mobility.
This still leaves open the question of why pensions reduce mobility. One
factor which has always been thought to be important is vesting. A worker who
is considering leaving a company may remain with the firm longer than he would
otherwise in order to receive a pension. The impact of vesting on turnover
depends on how much pension wealth is obtained at vesting. The available
evidence indicates that for most workers this gain is fairly small. Looking
across 1183 plans in the BLS 1979 Level of Benefits survey, Kotlikoff and
Wise (1985) show that the gain in pension wealth when vesting occurs at age 40
ranges between 5 and 37 percent of salary. At their intermediate wage and
interest rate assumptions, the gain is 14 percent. For most workers this
amounts to a few thousand dollars. This will be of critical importance to a
worker with 9 years of service who can move from zero to full vesting by
staying an additional year. It is not likely to have much effect on workers
with less than five years of service, the group where turnover is most likely
to take place. The only empirical evidence on this issue comes from a study
of persons covered by 133 pension plans done by Schiller and Weiss (1979).
They found that stricter vesting requirements were associated with hither exit
rates. Thus, both theory and evidence indicate that vesting is not likely to
explain why pensions reduce turnover.
There are three other possibilities. First, lower mobility rates for
workers covered by pensions may merely reflect a higher overall level of
compensation. Most studies include either actual or imputed wages as control
variables, so it should be no real surprise that they find a positive correla-44
tion between pension coverage and mobility. Workers covered by pensions have
higher total compensation than other workers ceteris paribus. A second
possible explanation is that pension benefit formulas are structured so that
there is a capital loss for those leaving the firm. As noted above, this can
only happen if the pension is part of an implicit labor contract. Under the
legal or explicit contract interpretation of the value of pension wealth,
there is no penalty for turnover. The final possibility is that the lower
mobility observed among workers covered by pensions reflects the use of
pensions as a sorting device. Workers who expect to stay with a firm are
attracted to firms which provide pensions; those who do not intend to stay
prefer a different compensation structure.
One can distinguish between these three explanations by focusing on the
coefficients of pension coverage, pension compensation, and the capital loss
associated with mobility. Under the first explanation, once pension compensa-
tion is added to the model, pension coverage should no longer be correlated
with mobility. If it is only greater compensation which ties workers around
to jobs with pensions, then the pension compensation variable will be a much
more accurate measure of the extra value of those jobs than the coverage
dummy. The validity of the second explanation depends on the correlation
between the capital loss and turnover. If the third explanation is correct,
then the coverage dummy will still be a good predictor of turnover but pension
compensation and the capital loss will be uncorrelated with turnover.
Allen, Clark, and McDermed (1986) examined the validity of each of these
by estimating length of service and mobility equations over three different
data sets; the results are summarized in Table 11. In every data set pension
coverage is a very strong predictor of length of service and turnover, even45
when the pension compensation and the capital loss variables are included in
the model. Also, except for the years of service equations estimated over the
May 1983 CPS (all spells in progress), pension compensation has no effect on
mobility or length of service. Both of these findings clearly contradict the
first explanation.
The results for the capital loss variable vary across each sample. In
both the CPS and the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) the capital loss
was strongly related to years of service. It was also correlated with lower
job change probabilities for workers between the ages of 45 and 54 in the
PSID. However, the capital loss had no effect on mobility for workers under
the age of 45 in the PSID, nor did it have any effect on mobility in the
National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) sample of older men.
A likely explanation for the negative findings on mobility for younger
workers is that the mean of capital loss of pension wealth per year of
remaining worklife is rather small. It is $36 for workers covered by pensions
who are less than 25 years old; $143 for between 25 and 34; and $335 for
those between 35 and 44. In contrast the average loss for workers between 45
and 54 is $590. Thus the loss may not have very much effect on workers under
45 because the loss is not very big.
This rationale does not apply to the workers in the NLS sample, where the
mean loss per year of remaining worklife is $1270. The key factor here is
probably the very low mobility rate in the sample. The average age of workers
in the sample in 1971 is 56 and only 17 percent of them change jobs over a ten
year period. Among those covered by pensions the mobility rate is an even
smaller 9 percent. Thus the capital loss may have little effect on mobility46
because a negligible proportion of older workers covered by pensions change
jobs.
The results also support the self selection argument. Self selection is
clearly not the only factor, as the capital loss results indicate. Yet
neither the capital loss variable nor the pension compensation variable can
account for the lower turnover observed among younger workers covered by
pensions. Self selection is the only remaining explanation for this group.
An estimate of the impact of this decline in turnover on productivity can
be obtained by using the result in Brown and Medoff (1978) that a decline of
the log of the annual quit rate equal to one results in an 11 percent increase
in productivity. Based on the PSID sample means, it seems reasonable to us
that pensions reduce turnover from about 4 percent per year to 2 percent.
This translates into a log change of -.69which is associated with a produc-
tivity increase of about 7.6 percent.
In addition to turnover, indirect evidence on the effect of pensions on
productivity can be obtained from studies of work attendance and retirement.
Allen (1981) found in a sample of 41 paper and box manufacturing plants that a
10 percent increase in monthly pension benefits per year of service is
associated with an increase in the absence rate of 0.2 percentage points (the
mean absence rate was 2.5 percent). This evidence is consistent with the
theory that workers consider income from benefits as exogenous in making labor
supply decisions and that increases in exogenous income reduce the number of
hours which employees desire to work.
The survey article by Mitchell and Fields (1982) indicates that most
studies find higher pensions tend to encourage earlier retirement. Further47
evidence in support of this conclusion appears in more recent studies by
Fields and Mitchell (1984) and Allen and Clark (1986).
The implications of these findings for productivity are not clear. Some
studies have indicated that the effect of age on productivity is insignificant
prior to age 60 or older. When productivity begins to decline (whether due to
changes in technology, depreciation of human capital, or changes in mental or
physical abilities), this need not translate into a drop in job performance.
Older workers may be able to adjust by having lower absence rates, lower
turnover rates, or increased quality of work. Reviews of studies concerning
the age-productivity relationship are provided by Clark and Spengler (1980),
Kreps (1977) and Riley and Foner (1968). In examining productivity by age, it
is also important to recognize that only workers who remain employed are
included in the measured population. The least productive workers may have
already quit or been fired, in which case earlier retirement of the remaining
workers may not be in the firm's best interests. Much needs to be learned
about these issues.
VII. Observations and Conclusions
The role of pensions as a form of compensation and as a method of achieving
personnel objectives has received substantial attention by economists over the
last decade. The rapid growth and now widespread use of employer-provided
pensions suggests that offering a pension as a form of compensation does not
adversely affect the economic performance or the profitability of firms.
Coverage rates vary significantly across industrial and occupational groups;
however, no sector has 100 percent coverage or zero coverage of workers by48
pensions. Thus, firms with and without pensions coexist side by side in many
different types of markets.
We have presented the first empirical evidence that the rate of profits
among firms is not affected by the existence of a pension. Obviously, pensions
cost the firm money but if they do not reduce profits then there must be some
compensating offsets either through a reduction of other labor costs or through
an increase in productivity. A brief review of existing studies of
compensating wage differentials attributable to pensions yields inconclusive
results. At best, we can conclude that there is no empirical basis for arguing
that wages or other forms of compensation decline in the presence of a
pension. This does not necessarily imply that there are no compensating wage
differentials for pension benefits; it merely means that there is presently
little empirical evidence of such differentials. We provide the first
estimates of the direct effect of pensions on labor productivity and are unable
to find any significant effect of pension coverage on productivity within
industries while holding constant average worker and firm characteristics.
If all of these findings are correct, how do firms offering pensions compete
with firms that do not provide this form of compensation? There are two
possibilities. First, the evidence seems to indicate that the answer is
indirect productivity effects. Instead of being neutral sellers of pensions to
workers, firms use pensions to achieve personnel objectives. These objectives
are to reduce turnover during most of the employee's worklife and to increase
retirement rates among older workers. Lower turnover means fewer resources are
devoted to hiring and training new workers. It increases the proportion of
workers with a greater amount of job tenure and on the average this raises
labor productivity. Earlier retirement among older workers may reduceaverage49
salaries and also may affect average productivity of workers. The second
possibility is that the empirical results are misleading, particularly those on
compensating wage differentials.
These changes in the age-tenure composition of the labor force and their
effect on productivity are not captured in the productivity regressions
discussed above. It seems likely that they provide the solution to our
puzzle. Furthermore, these effects may provide an explanation for the pattern
of pension coverage across firms. Firms with greater costs of turnover should
be more likely to offer pensions. Firms in which workers suffer greater
productivity declines with advancing age should be more likely to offer
pensions. Since these are different objectives, some firms may wish to
discourage turnover but not encourage earlier retirement. These firms should
have different plan characteristics than firms which seek to encourage early
retirement.
Many of the conclusions concerning pensions and firm performance are quite
tentative and must await further confirmation. Past studies have been hindered
by a lack of data that relates plan features and the characteristics of
sponsoring firm to worker characteristics. The 1983 Survey of Consumer Finance
may be helpful in this regard but it does not allow the researcher to determine
the productivity and profitability of the firm. We anticipate continued
progress in the estimation of the effect of pensions on mobility and retirement
decisions. A greater knowledge of these effects and a better understanding of
the link between age, tenure and productivity would significantly increase our
understanding of the relationship between pensions and firm performance. It
would be useful to have a theory of the optimal age structure of a firm and how
pensions can be used to achieve this objective.50
One element of the relationship between pensions and firm performance which
this study has not addressed is the impact of the financial status of the
pension plan. Studies of market valuation done by Feldstein and Seligman
(1981), Feldstein and Morck (1983), and Bulow, Morck, and Summers (1985) all
indicate that the stock market treats net assets in a pension plan as if they
were part of the corporate balance sheet. In other words, underfunded pension
plans translate into a lower market value of the firm's stock, with the decline
in market value equal to the funding liability.
The recent decline in interest rates and the accompanying bull market have
put most pension plans on excellent financial footing. A growing number of
plans are being terminated with the excess assets reverting to the firm. In
most cases, a new pension plan is created after a termination which preserves
the legal pension wealth of both participants and annuitants. It remains to be
seen whether their wealth under the implicit contract interpretation of the
firm's pension promises will also be preserved and, if not, what impact this
will have on employee behavior.Table 1. Determinants of Pension Coverage, 1983CPSa
Marginal impact on
Percentage pension coverage
covered by probability from










1000 or more 85.9 10.2
Company size




1000 or more 79.7 45.2
Industry
Agriculture, forestry, fisheries 11.3 4.0*
Mining 74.0 14.4
Construction 35.9 -11.0
Durable manufacturing 72.2 9.2
Nondurable manufacturing 64.7 6.2
Transportation and utilities 70.8 2.2*
Wholesale trade 52.1 11.6
Retail trade 31.7 35*





Professional specialty 61.6 0.1*
Technicians & related support 60.0 -3.0*
Sales 42.6 -6.0
Administrative support, 55.8 3.4*
including clerical
Private household service 0.0 -- -
Protectiveservice 37.7 -17.7
Other service 27.6 -8.9
Precision production, 57.4 -1.3*
craft & repair
Machine operators, assemblers 59.5 47*
& inspectors
Transporation & material 53.7 -3.6*
moving
51Table 1. Determinants of Pension Coverage, 1983CpSa (cont'd)
Marginal impacton
Percentage pension
covered by probability from




Farming, forestry & fishing 11.1 -17.2
Region
Northeast 57.5 7.8





















More than 16 66.6 10.1
Average hourly earnings
Less than $4 13.2
$4 -$5.99 31.8 17.6
$6 -$7.99 51.8 28.6
$8 -$9.99 63.2 32.9
$10 -$14.99 73.3 37.4
$15 or more 79.4 41.2
aSp1e is limited to private wage and salary workers between theages of
16 and 64 who usually work more than 35 hoursper week. The estimates
in the second column are probit estimates of the derivative of the
probability function evaluated at the means of the independent
variables. All of the above variables were included in the probit
equation. Estimates with a significance level below the 95 percent









1,000- 10,000 3.6 11.2
Greaterthan 10,000 .7 4.9
Total 2.0 22.4
Source: Richard Ippolito, "A Study of the Regulatory Impact of ERISA,"
unpublished paper, July 1986, Table 4.
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Percent Awarded Percent of
Increase 1973 Benefit Increase 1973 Benefit
1973 45.0 100.0 25.6 100.0
1974 59.6 105.6 31.6 101.3
1975 62.2 110.3 35.6 105.1
1976 52.6 114.7 19.1 108.9
1977 60.4 119.4 42.9 110.3
1978 65.6 123.2 11.4 117.2
1979 128.6 118.5
Change1973-79 28.6 18.5
Source: Robert Clark, Steven Allen, and Daniel Sumner, "Inflation and Pension
Benefits," in Richard Ippolito and Walter Kolodrubetz (Eds.) The Handbook of










30 10 $ 7,743 $ 321 96.0 4.0
35 15 8,891 456 95.1 4.9
40 20 10,174 663 93.9 6.1
45 25 11,606 957 92.4 7.6
50 30 13,189 1,374 90.6 9.4
55 35 14,914 1,969 88.3 11.7
60 40 16,753 2,820 85.6 14.4
64 44 18,262 3,767 82.9 17.1
65 45 22,796 -106 100.5 -0.5
70 50 30,118 -3,814 114.5 -14.5
aThe analysis is based on a defined benefit plan with an earnings based formula.
Salary average is computed over the last 5 years of earnings and the generosity
parameter is 1.0 percent per year of service.
Source: Robert Clark and Ann McDermed, "Earnings and Pension Compensation: The
Effect of Eligibility," Quarterly Journal of Economics XCXI (1986): 341-61.Table 5. Lifetime Compensation (ProjectedEarnings Method):










25 0 8,839 1,161 10,000 0
Leaving
0
35 10 11,866 1,573 13,439 15,728 8,921
40 15 13,744 1,835 15,580 27,529 13,727
45 20 15,912 2,150 18,061 42,990 18,029
50 25 18,398 2,540 20,938 63,492 20,833
55 30 21,231 3,042 24,273 91,259 20,416
60 35 24,428 3,711 28,139 129,870 13,661
64 39 31,448 222 31,670 173,174 0
65 40 32,809 -188 32,620 181,514 0
70 45 43,873 -6,057 37,816 227,394 0
aThe analysis is based on theaverage plan in manufacturing for professional workers.
The plan is a defined benefit plan with anearnings based formula. Average salary is
computed over the last 5 years of earnings and the generosityparameter is 1.53
percent per year of service.
Source: Steven Allen, Robert Clark, and Ann McDermed, "JobMobility, Older Workers,
and the Role of Pensions," Final Report for U.S.Department of Labor
Contract No. J-9-M-5-0049, October 1986.
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Schiller and Weiss (1980) 1969 Labor Dept. private perisicn
filentch with SSi earnings
histories; neles in defined
benefit plans
Coefficient of legal mstbod
pensicti ccmpensaticn in log
earnings equaticti is -1 for
45-54 age grxip 1*it m ge-
pensicn tradeoff for other
fair age grxips
&nith (1981) 1976 Pennsylvania txn—uniforn.d
goverrmnt rkers in defined
benefit plans
Coefficient of legal ntbod
pensicii ccnipensatiou in log
earnings equaticn is -1
Soith and threrIberg (1983)200 finns providing pensiou
and earnings data to Hay
Associates
Earnings difference across
Hay Point levels within
firms uncorrelated with
either difference in
pensicri 'vale or difference
in pensic*i costs
Indirect tests
Elirenberg (1980) 1973 data ci police and
fireflgjiters
Entrance pay and amxinun
earnings Inversely related to
ratio of benefits to earnings
to earnings for police; ne
correlatici for fireflgbters




uncorrelated with ratio of
benefits to earnings
Clark and Derned (1986a)1971-75 Retirnt History
Survey; full-tine msles
Earnings significantly higher
for tbose or1dng past age of
pensici eligibility to offset
drop in pensicn txxnpensaticn
Mitchell and Pozzebcn (1986)1983 Survey of Ccz'stmr
Finance; private nxagricu1trua1
ge and salary employees
Icg lx*irly ge significantly
higher for tbose covered by
either defined benefit or
defined caitrihitici plans
Source: Olivia Mitchell, and Sil'vana Pozzebcn, "Wages, Pens loris and the
Wage-Pensici Tradeoff," unpiblished paper, 1986.58

































List 1: Average weekly hours, averageage, average years of schooling
completed, percentage covered by union contracts, percentage in
small establishments, percentage with less than oneyear of service,
percentage married, percentage white, percentage male
List 2: Age, years of schooling completed, union contractcoverage, sex,
























with fewer than 25 people
Ratio with less than









































Pension coverage 1983 .317
(.316)
Pension coverage 1979 -.026
(.424)
Percentage union -.039 .164
1973-75 (.298) (.344)
Change in percentage union -. 764 -. 649
1973-75 to 1984 (.530) (.553)
Concentration ratio 1972 .344 .417
(.157) (.157)
Change in 1.288 1.226
concentration ratio (.499) (.500)
1972 to 1982
R & D intensity 1.160 1.187
(.576) (.583)
.234 .222








union contracts -.368 .855
(.477) (2.134)
Ratio in establishments
with fewer than 25 people -. 355 -.438
(.499) (.516)
Ratio with less than
one year of service .742 7.273
(1.027) (5.017)
Average age .007 .136
(.024) (.100)
Average years of
schooling completed -.045 -.106
(.078) (.100)
Average weekly hours .066 .062
(.037) (.037)









































Table 11.Evidence cti the Impact of Pensiai
Service, Job thange Probability,




dependent Pensicii Pensiai Pensicn
variable coverage canpensaticxi loss
May GPS 1979-1983; Survival rates are
survival rates across 35-47 percentage
100 pensictage/ points higher
iistrf/occupaticxi
cells
May 1983 CPS; years Years of service Years of service }bsitively correlated
of service Increases by 34 to 49% Increases by 5% with with years of service
each duller
1975-82 PSID 1x*iselxldReduces job change I'b effect in any grc*ip Reduces job change
heads under 55; job probabilities for all probabilities for 45-54 year
change probability fcxr age grips olds; r effect cxi other age
grps
1975-82 PSID lx*aseheldReduces quit effect In any grip t'b effect in any grcxip
heads under 55; quit probabilities for
probability 25-34, 35-44, 45-54
agegraips
1975-82 PSID 1xiseboldMditiaial years b effect Mditienal years of service
heads under 55;hazardof service 28% higher 22% higher for $10,000 loss
for additictial years of
service cxi 1975 job
1971-81 NLS older ni; Reduces job change lb effect lb effect
job change probabilityprobability by 11
to 16 percentage points
1971-81 NLS older nn; Reduces quit probabilitylb effect lb effect
quit probability by 8 percentage points
Scce: Steven Allen, Robert Clark, arK! Ann }kDernied, "Job Wbility, Older Workers and the Role of Pens ictis,"
Final Report for U.S. Departxint of Labor Ccntract lb. J-9-M-5-0049, October 1986.63
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